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I INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we study whether between firm learning leads to increased 
agglomeration of close rivals within given markets. While on the industry 
level, it has been documented that different forces may lead to agglomeration 
(e.g. Ellison and Glaeser, 1997, 1999), and there are good examples of retail 
industries where search costs provide a compelling reason for agglomeration 
(to give just a couple, in London, Tottenham Court Road is famous for 
electronics retailers, and Hatton Garden is famous for its jewelers), it is far 
less clear that this should happen in industries that are characterized by 
multiple outlets per firm, between firm competition, and (relative) 
unimportance of search costs.   
 Whilst economists have made good progress in understanding the 
dynamics of competition in various industries, retailing has been relatively 
neglected despite its tremendous importance to modern societies. Analogous 
to the old saw of the literature on technology diffusion which states that the 
benefits of a new technology are only realized through (widespread) adoption 
of the technology, (widespread) consumption possibilities are only created 
once retail firms establish themselves within the reach of potential customers.  
Similarly, one could argue that location decisions in retailing are one form of 
new product introductions, whose importance to welfare is undisputed, even 
if hard to quantify empirically (for significant attempts, see Trajtenberg, 1989, 
Petrin, 2002). For these reasons alone, an improved understanding of the 
forces determining where to locate retail outlets is important. 
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 We study these questions using data on McDonald’s (McD) and Burger 
King (BK) outlets in the UK in the mid-90s. Toivanen and Waterson (2003) 
show that between firm learning affects these firms’ decisions on which 
markets to enter. Here we ask whether between firm learning affects location 
choices within a given market. The rationale for studying UK fast food burger 
chains is pragmatic: it can be argued that these two firms were the only two 
strategic competitors in the market in the early 90’s; furthermore, they were 
opening outlets at a fast and increasing pace, creating variation over 
geographical markets necessary to our tests. In addition, reasonable 
geographical proxies for local markets are available, as are socio-economic 
variables characterizing these markets. Also, it is important to us that it can 
be argued that BK’s expansion possibilities experienced a discontinuity in 
1990, due to firm reorganization. 
 Our research strategy is as follows. We concentrate mostly on BK 
location decisions, for reasons that will become clear below. Using survey 
evidence, we first document that product differentiation between these firms 
is small even when not controlling for effects of distance. Nonetheless, we 
then study whether the location patterns we observe in the data are what one 
would expect to see if a) pre-emption, b) product differentiation, c) between 
firm learning is the driving force of BK location decisions. We perform three 
types of tests. First, we study markets where McD was established before BK. 
We test whether BK locates its first outlet closer to the first (second etc.) McD 
outlet than would be expected by pure chance.  We show that BK locates its 
first outlet closer to the first McD outlet than would be expected, thereby 
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ruling out the pre-emption story. Second, we look at markets where 1) BK 
opens an outlet (McD being the first) and 2) there is a total of three outlets 
by the end of our observation period. We document that the distance 
between the BK outlet and the first McD outlet is smaller than would be 
expected if only product differentiation was the determinant of location. 
Finally, we compare distances between the first McD outlet and the first BK 
outlet to those between the first McD outlet and other fast food chains such 
as Kentucky Fried Chicken, whose degree of product differentiation vis-à-vis 
McD is clearly larger than that of BK’s. We document that BK does not locate 
significantly further away from McD than these other chains, thereby 
providing evidence against the product differentiation hypothesis.  
 All these tests are performed under the implicit assumption that all 
locations within a market are equal. They all point to the direction that BK 
locates close to the first McD outlet. There is at least one obvious reason why 
the location of the first outlet might be better than that of subsequent outlets, 
providing a potential alternative explanation for the above results. It may well 
be that McD opens the first outlet in each market in the location with the 
highest within-market demand. To control for this, we resort to two 
approaches. First, we compare distances between outlets in two sets of 
markets: one in which each of the first three outlets is a McD, and another 
where there is one BK and two McD outlets. We show that the distance 
between the first McD outlet and the BK outlet is less than any of the other 
distances; this is evidence against the proposition that the first outlet’s 
location is more profitable. Second, we run regressions explaining the 
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distance between the first (and second) McD outlet and the first BK outlet by 
market level controls and the rank of the McD outlet in question, together 
with the time it has been in the market prior to 1990. The idea is that the 
rank of the outlet controls for location specific demand, and the time in the 
market is a measure of the strength of the signal1 to BK. BK could, thanks to 
its reorganization, more effectively use this information after 1990 than prior 
to it. We find that, ceteris paribus, the longer the first McD outlet has been in 
the market, the closer BK locates to it. Taken together, these results suggest 
that even a firm like BK, which has great experience in opening outlets, 
resorts to between firm learning when deciding where to locate its outlets, 
and that this effect more than outweighs the effects that smaller distance 
would have on competition between firms. 
 The literature on entry and competition (in retail) has taken great 
strides recently, particularly with the papers of Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2002), 
Thomadsen (2002), and Davis (2002). All of these build on the seminal work 
of Bresnahan and Reiss (1989, 1990, 1991) and Berry (1991). Mazzeo studies 
product differentiation decisions in the hotel industry. In her paper, Seim 
examines location decisions, but explicitly concentrates on the effects of 
competition. Thomadsen takes location as given, and studies pricing 
decisions, using (US) data on McD and BK. Davis, using an extensive data set 
on movie theaters, studies competitive effects between firms, and the effect 
distance has on these.  
                                                 
1 More accurately, it is a measure of how many draws from the sampling distribution of profitability 
BK has been able to obtain. 
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 This paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we briefly 
and informally discuss the different relevant theories affecting location 
decisions of firms. In the third section, we describe the industry and the data. 
Section four contains our tests, and Section five concludes. 
II THEORY 
1. Pre-emption 
The well-established theoretical pre-emption literature (Prescott and Visscher, 
1977; Schmalensee, 1978; Eaton and Lipsey, 1979) states that a firm may 
have the foresight to crowd the product space in order to prevent rivals from 
entering, so as to increase its profits. If this was truly successful, we would 
see a preponderance of markets with several McDs and no BKs at all, and 
possibly some with several BKs and no McDs.  There are examples of such 
markets, but far more common is the case where several McDs are present 
before a BK arrives.  Plausibly, action by the incumbent has significantly 
delayed opening by the other player.  This suggests a variant of the 
hypothesis, namely that the leaders’ outlets, or at least a subset of them, are 
on average closer to each other than to the follower outlet. The explanation 
for this would be that the leader has crowded out the best locations in the 
town by placing so many outlets in it/them that it becomes unprofitable for 
the follower to enter those locations. If there are systematic profitability 
differences between the outlets (e.g., the first one in each market being 
located where the within market demand is highest), successful pre-emption 
should make it less likely that the rival opens close to more profitable outlets. 
 2. Product differentiation 
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Irmen and Thisse (1998) show in a tightly parameterized model of multi-
dimensional product differentiation that rivals want to locate their products 
(=outlets in our case) as close to each other in all but one dimension of 
product quality. In this, the most important dimension, they maximize 
differences.  Assume for a moment (we provide evidence below) that location 
or distance is the most important source of product differentiation between 
the two firms in our sample, and consider a market with two McDs and one 
BK outlet. We would then expect that BK would locate its outlet further away 
from a given McD outlet than McD locates its second outlet.  The reason for 
this is that BK wants to avoid head-to-head competition, whereas McD can 
internalize the demand effects that two adjacent outlets have on each other.2 
As an extension of this hypothesis, if another chain produces a 
significantly different product from McD (say, a pizza range), the Irmen-
Thisse model predicts a close physical location is likely, assuming the first 
McD location was well chosen.  It is also more likely that a pizza restaurant 
locates near McD than BK locating close to McD. 
3. Learning 
The story about learning we have in mind builds on two different literatures. 
On the one hand, the economics learning literature (see e.g. Caplin and 
Leahy, 1998) shows that firms may want to locate close to each other 
because later arrivals learn from the early arrivals about the profitability of 
the location. On the other hand, the management literature suggests that 
                                                 
2 Here we note that there is an important difference between the UK and the US. In the US (see e.g. 
Thomadsen, 2002) managers/franchisees of individual outlets have  considerable pricing freedom, this 
is far less true in the UK. 
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firms learn ‘vicariously’ from each other. As Baum et al. (2000, p. 774) put it, 
“organizations learn vicariously, imitating or avoiding specific actions or 
practices… For expanding chains, location choices of large chains may be a 
particularly important source of information to reduce uncertainty about 
locations that can support growth…”. 
 In Section IV.3 we demonstrate how a standard decision theoretic 
framework suggests that if (Bayesian) learning is taking place, the longer the 
first McD has been in existence, the more likely it is that BK chooses a site 
close to that McD outlet. 
 
III DATA 
1. The Industry 
Our data come from the UK fast food industry. As detailed in Toivanen and 
Waterson (2003), for the early 1990’s at least, this industry is very 
straightforward. One can argue that there are only two players large enough 
to be considered strategic: McD and BK. The third largest firm, Wimpy, was 
excluded from the counter service market both by contract (a contract 
between Wimpy and BK precluded Wimpy from opening over the counter 
outlets before June 1993), and it seems, by choice (by end of 1994, all 240 
Wimpy outlets were table seated, by mid-1996 it had grown only to 272 
outlets, and in 2001 still had less than 300 outlets; its marketing budget is an 
order of magnitude smaller than the other two). Table 1 outlines the 
development of these two firms and the industry. What is important to us is 
that since its entry into the UK in 1974, McD has grown steadily and 
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consistently by opening new outlets of its own. BK as it now exists, in 
contrast, is the outcome of a complicated story where two relatively small 
competitors (BK and Wimpy) are first merged and then partly separated. The 
outcome was that by 1990 BK emerged with a clearly larger number of 
outlets, and larger resources for expansion than Wimpy.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
It is important, in the British context, to have in mind a picture of the 
“typical” location of a fast food outlet within the district at the time of our 
study.  This is not in a mall (i.e. a confined and defined space), nor in a drive-
through edge-of-town location.  Rather, it is on a high street, within a 
traditional shopping area that lacks tightly defined boundaries3 
Another characteristic of difference between outlets in the UK and those, 
for example, in the US (see Thomadsen, 2002) is that price competition 
between outlets within a chain is extremely muted.  It is common for both BK 
and McD national television advertising campaigns to feature price 
information on particular fast food items (albeit always with the necessary 
legal caveat “at participating restaurants”)4.  Furthermore, encroachment is 
not a contentious issue in the UK.  McD’s contracts typically offer the 
                                                 
3 Specifically, the modal McDonalds outlet in the data set we use is of this type.  For example, all but 
seven of the 57 first outlet McDonalds are in a high street location, several of them actually on a street 
with this name! 
4 At time of writing, the McDonalds UK website lists prices for a range of menu items including a 
“Happy meal”, a cheeseburger, etc.  Burger King’s UK website also features a range of prices 
including the price for its signature product, the Whopper.  By coincidence, the Happy Meal and the 
Whopper are identically priced. 
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franchisee a site the company has developed, and are explicit in excluding 
legal claims from franchisees regarding subsequent openings.5 
 We match the company outlet data6 with Local Authority District (LAD) 
data. LADs are administrative and planning districts, largely centered on a 
particular town, that reasonably well proxy for markets. Socio-economic data 
is available at LAD level on an annual basis7.  Table 2 shows that they vary a 
good deal across a number of dimensions such as population, leading to very 
different degrees of penetration by our burger chains. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
2. Outlet locations 
As we are interested in within market location, we calculated the distances 
between outlets in our chosen markets. Using the facility on 
http://www.streetmap.co.uk/ for converting postcodes to Ordnance Survey 
grid co-ordinates, each was mapped to a co-ordinate8 and the Euclidean 
distance between outlets calculated. We chose markets fulfilling the following 
three criteria into our sample: 
a. Both key players (McD and BK) are in the market at the end of our 
period (end 1995). 
                                                 
  5 The source of these last observations is inspection of the set of agreements registered with the Office 
of Fair Trading under the provisions of the Restrictive Trades Practices Act 1976 and subsequent 
legislation.  Files numbered 6193, 6194, 15127 and 15678 contain examples.   
6  All McD data was received from the company itself. For BK, we received the addresses of all their 
outlets as of end of 1995, and for a proportion, the opening dates. For the rest, we collected the opening 
dates from a variety of sources. For details, see Toivanen and Waterson (2003) data appendix. 
7 These data largely come from Regional Trends or its sources; see again the Data Appendix to 
Toivanen and Waterson (2003). 
8 Each UK postcode covers no more than 15 addresses, roughly a block or less.  Coordinates thus 
generated are accurate to within 100 metres. 
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b. We can date order which player was first into the market, and 
determine the ordering of outlets up to the point at which the other 
player entered. 
c. There are at least three outlets associated with these players in 
total. 
From the set of 57 markets fitting these criteria, we stopped recording outlet 
details regarding location (i.e. their postcode) once the second player had 
entered for the first time.  Our set of districts is divided into two subsets.  In 
the first, consisting of the first 34 observations listed in Table 3, there are 
three or more outlets (up to 6), of which only the most recent is the outlet of 
a different firm than all previous entries.  In the second set, the final 23 
observations, there are three outlets, with the chronological order of outlet 
openings by firms A and B being A, B, A, or A, B, B.9 We use different sub-
samples of these data. Some key distance and firm statistics are shown in 
Table 3.  By comparison with Table 2, we note that on average, the included 
districts are around 1/3 the area of the average district.  Large, typically rural, 
LADs mostly have few or no fast food outlets. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
It is noteworthy that there is a very significant difference in Table 3 between 
the median distance between same-firm outlets and different-firm outlets. 
3. Consumer behavior 
If customers largely patronized the outlets of different firms, close spatial 
location of McD and BK outlets would not be problematic from the viewpoint 
                                                 
9 In four cases, we are unsure of characterization since the second and third outlets open in quick 
succession, but this does not affect the hypotheses tested. 
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of avoiding head to head competition.  In fact, most people who buy burgers 
visit both brands of outlet.  A report by a market research company, Mintel 
(1998) details information that allows us to calculate lower bounds for the 
overlap between McD and BK by reporting what percentage of their sample i) 
has visited any hamburger restaurant in the last three months, ii) McD, iii) BK. 
By assuming that all those that visited a hamburger restaurant but did not 
visit McD did visit BK, we can calculate that over all customer groups, at 
minimum 73% of those consumers in the Mintel sample that visited a BK 
outlet also visited a McD outlet. For different age groups, the figure varies 
between 87% for 20-24 year olds and zero for those over 65. Calculating the 
same statistic for Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) and BK, and setting a lower 
bound of zero for the measure, we find that 0.6% of BK customers also 
patronized a KFC during the three month period. This information not only 
confirms the probably common prior that McD and BK are closer in product 
space than BK and KFC, but also that McD and BK are close in product space. 
Recall that the Mintel figures do not condition on distance, and therefore 
these lower bounds already include the differentiating effect of distance. The 
amount of product differentiation due to product quality is therefore even less 
than these figures suggest.  
IV TESTS 
1. Pre-emption 
Our first test is designed to discriminate between the pre-emption explanation 
on the one hand, and product differentiation or learning on the other hand. 
For this purpose, we use the first subset, of 34 districts. We test whether the 
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distance between the outlet of the following firm and any of the leader’s 
outlets is greater or less than the distance between any of the leaders’ 
outlets.  The Null is that there is no difference on average (i.e. that physical 
location does not matter).  Hence, under the Null, if the entry pattern is A, A, 
B, the probability of the distance between B and one of the A’s being less 
than the distance between the two A’s is 2/3.  Similarly, if the pattern is A, A, 
A, A, A, B, then the equivalent probability is only 1/3 (5 ways out of 15). Our 
test uses a series of simulations to take into account that the probability 
under the Null varies across observations.10 The alternative hypothesis of pre-
emption predicts that the follower outlet is further away from leader outlets 
than the leader outlets are from each other, on average.11  
For each observation in the sample, a simulation round involved a 
random draw of a zero-one variable, where the indicator function takes the 
value 
1 iff mindist (A, B) < mindist (A, A’), for all A, A’ 
for a market with n “A” outlets and one “B” outlet and the probability of this 
happening comes from the above calculations based on actual market 
structures. We then weight these draws by the relative frequency of the 
different market structures that we observe, and calculate the distribution of 
the sum of “1” answers we have generated, which is a sufficient statistic for 
the test.  The 99th percentile of that generated distribution, 28, is compared 
                                                 
10 We are very grateful to Michael Pitt for his work on the details of this approach including providing 
the coding which enabled this test. We took a total of 40,000 simulations. 
11 West (1981) has performed an alternative test of pre-emption, using data on supermarket locations in 
greater Vancouver.  His approach, using market boundaries, is less appropriate in the context of a 
market where many consumers may choose not to purchase from any outlet.  
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to what we observe in the data. This figure, 29, easily allows us to reject the 
Null at better than 1% level.  This is strong evidence against the pre-emption 
story.   
2. Product differentiation 
Unlike learning, product differentiation affects the distances between any pair 
of outlets. We therefore proceed under the implicit assumption that all 
locations are identical, and look at markets with two outlets of one firm, and 
one of the other. In this second subset of Table 3, with the form A1, B1, A2, or 
A1, B1, B2, (or in four cases, a tie between A1, B1, B2 and A1, A2, B1) we test 
whether the distance between the first outlet of the follower (B1) and the 
initial leader outlet (A1) is less than the distance between the other pairs, 
follower and third outlet and initial outlet and third outlet.  Under the Null, 
where fascia is irrelevant, the probability of this is 1/3. Assuming nationally 
set prices (see footnote 3 above), if product differentiation is of some 
importance, we expect a greater distance between the two outlets of the 
same firm than between either of the other pairs, as two outlets of the same 
firm produce identical products, whereas there is some – even if only a 
limited amount of – product differentiation in the quality dimension between 
the two rivals. Under the learning alternative we expect the least distance 
between the outlets B1 and A1. 12  
Twenty of the second set of 23 districts, listed in Table 4, across which 
this test can be performed, satisfy the alternative hypothesis that is consistent 
                                                 
12 Joseph (2003) shows in a model of product differentiation (but without learning) where there is 
simultaneous location of two McD outlets, followed by BK choosing a location, that one possible 
equilibrium is for BK to locate very near one of the McDs.  But this involves clearly different timing 
from that in our experiments. 
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with learning.  With a t-value of -7.64, this allows us to reject the Null in favor 
of the one-sided (learning) alternative at better than 1% level.  We can 
alternatively test the difference between mean distances across the three 
pairs.  As seen in Table 4, there are large numerical differences between 
these mean values.  Again, the alternative consistent with learning is 
accepted over the Null and the product differentiation alternative, with the t-
value related to the lesser difference being -3.57 and the difference between 
the other two mean distances being insignificant. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 Our second test of product differentiation involves looking at the 
distances between McD and BK, McD and KFC, and BK and KFC, and similarly 
between the hamburger firms and Pizza Hut. The common prior would 
probably be that the two hamburger firms are closer together in product 
space than either is to KFC or Pizza Hut. If this is so, then we would expect 
that KFC and Pizza Hut locate closer to the hamburger firms than these to 
each other. Here we do not have data on opening date, simply data on 
presence as of 1994.  These come from the source Retail Directory of the UK. 
This provides a street-by-street listing of retail outlets in most major UK town 
centres, from which we extracted information on the additional chains of 
interest.  Therefore, in this final sample, we restrict outlets under 
consideration to those that appear in the town centre.13  In order to make the 
                                                 
13 The town centre is a sub-element of a local authority district.  Where there is more than one 
McDonalds or Burger King, we took the min of the distances. 
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tests meaningful, we restrict our sample to those town centres where three or 
four of the players appear. 
 As Table 5 shows, this distance data is noisy. A series of comparisons 
are available.  In the upper panel, these are performed using absolute 
distances within matched sub-samples.  In the lower panel, we bring distance 
to a common base, so we analyze relative distances within maximally sized 
sub-samples.  In some ways, the median provides the best method of 
comparison in this table, since outliers where the nearest outlets are some 
kilometers apart affect all the means.  Looking first at the three-way 
comparison between McD, BK and Pizza Hut, we might expect under product 
differentiation that the MB distance would be greater than the other two.  
However, it is not.  By contrast, the three-way comparison involving KFC does 
provide some support for the product differentiation hypothesis.  Yet, turning 
to the comparisons involving Wimpy, no support is offered, since the MB 
distance is smallest.   
Now turning to the lower panel, the values listed are taken as a 
proportion of the “diameter” of the LAD, assuming it approximates a circle.  
Thus for example, the median distance between McD and Wimpy outlets 
across 20 cases is less than 2% of the diameter of those respective districts.  
The main feature coming out of this comparison is that the median 
proportions are all small, save that between successive McD outlets, which is 
significantly larger.   
TABLE 5 HERE 
3. Learning 
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All the above tests produced evidence that BK locates closer to the first 
McD outlet than we would expect if pre-emption behavior, product 
differentiation or pure chance explained the location patterns. Our suggestion 
is that this pattern is due to learning. Alternatively, however, it could be that 
the first McD outlet is located in a particularly profitable location, and BK 
therefore places its (first) outlet close to the first McD. For this to be true, one 
has to provide an explanation as to why the location of the first McD would 
consistently be better than that of subsequent McD outlets. One possibility is 
the following: assume that demand for fast food (hamburgers) in the UK ever 
since the mid-70s, has increased at a constant rate both between and within 
markets. Assume also that within market differences in demand are known. 
Assume further that even a firm like McD faces constraints as to how many 
outlets per period it can open, or alternatively, that the costs of opening an 
outlet in a given period are convex in the number of outlets opened in that 
period. What would be an optimal entry strategy in such circumstances?  
According to this story, McD could already in 1974 when it entered the 
UK rank all the possible outlet locations in terms of profitability. It would 
however not be optimal to enter all locations right away, as this would 
increase costs of entry compared to the alternative of opening in some 
locations in the following year(s). It would be optimal to open in the best 
locations first. If this is the strategy McD has followed, then the first location 
in each market is the most profitable location in that market.  Our above 
reported findings would then simply provide evidence that BK, too, is able to 
rank locations within (and between markets), and therefore locates close to 
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the first McD outlet. No inter-firm learning takes place. We test this story 
against learning in two ways. 
Our first test of learning involves a subset of the data used above. In 
the product differentiation test, we looked at markets with three outlets. It 
turns out that 16 of them have the entry time ordering mbm. By chance, 
there are also 16 cases in our data that start mmm.  This suggests a 
comparison between the sets of distances in each case.  In other words, the 
mmm cases might serve as a useful point of reference from which to analyse 
the mbm ones.  Especially, it allows us for the first time to tackle the issue of 
location heterogeneity. If it is true that the first McD is located in the most 
profitable location within a market, then we would expect the second McD 
also to be located ‘close’ to the first one (close meaning closer than the third 
is to the first). Table 6 sets out the relevant means and standard deviations 
for these two samples.  As is fairly evident from the raw means, there is no 
significant difference between any of the mean distances between outlets in 
the mmm cases, providing evidence against the first outlet’s location being 
better than the others.  However, there is a significant difference between the 
m1b and the other two distances in the mbm cases, with a t-value of over 4.  
This provides evidence for learning against product differentiation. It is also 
interesting that the m2b distance is not significantly different from the m1m2 
distance. 
TABLE 6 HERE 
 The theoretical justification for our second test of learning comes from 
standard Bayesian decision theory. It can be shown that, conditional on the 
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draws being positive (higher than the prior) on average, the posterior of an 
experiment with a larger number of draws is larger (on average) than that of 
an experiment with a smaller number of draws.14 Further, this difference is 
growing in the difference in the number of draws. In our data, the inability of 
BK to exploit information prior to 1990 gave it a chance to sample from 
different distributions, i.e., to observe the profitability of first McD outlets in 
different markets. The number of draws available to BK varied over the 
markets depending on when McD had opened the first outlet, giving us 
observable variation in this metric. Also, the fact that BK tends to locate close 
to the first McD is evidence for the draws (signals of profitability of the 
location of the first McD outlet) being on average higher than the prior.  
Our hypothesis is thus an implication of Bayesian decision making: the 
larger the number of draws (the longer the first McD has been in existence 
prior to 1990), ceteris paribus, the higher the mean posterior, and therefore, 
the more likely it is that BK locates close to the first McD outlet. 
Our second set of tests exploits an implication of the above story of 
how the profitability of the locations of first McD outlets varies over markets, 
providing us with a way of controlling for differences in the profitability of the 
first McD outlets. If McD behaves as outlined above, then the ranking of McD 
outlets is an (exact, but ordinal) measure of the relative profitability of McD 
outlets. Further, if BK has used time prior to 1990 to observe the profitability 
of different (first in the market) McD outlets, the time a McD outlet has 
                                                 
14 This assumes the same prior mean and precision for both or all locations, and same mean and 
precision for the draws. See e.g. deGroot (1970, p. 167). Another implication of the model is that the 
precision grows in the number of draws, strengthening our argument further. 
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existed prior to 1990 is a measure of the number of draws BK has been able 
to sample for a given McD outlet. We therefore take all markets where McD 
has at least two outlets by the time of BK entry, and estimate the following 
regression: 
(1) iimimiibm ranktimeXdist ebba +++= ,12,11,,1 ' . 
In (1), the dependent variable is the distance (in meters) between the first 
McD outlet and the BK outlet in market i, X is a vector of market 
characteristics that controls for observed differences between markets, time is 
the time prior to 1990 that the first McD outlet has been in existence in 
market i, and rank is a measure of the rank of the first McD outlet in market 
i.15 If our story is correct, time should be significantly negative in (1), 
controlling for rank. 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 We have performed a large number of estimations of (1) using 
different distance, time and rank variables. We compile the evidence on the 
relationship between these variables into Table 7, but suppress the results on 
the control vector.16 It is clear from the reported results that despite the small 
sample size, we find a consistent, most of the time statistically significant, 
negative relationship between the distance at which BK locates its first outlet 
from the first McD outlet and the time that the first McD outlet has been in 
                                                 
15 Although these measures are naturally highly correlated, the correlation is not perfect due to the large 
number of outlets opened each year by McD in the 1980s. 
 
16 These are available upon request from the authors. 
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the market prior to 1990.17 The rank of the first outlet almost never obtains a 
significant coefficient, supporting the earlier finding with the 16+16 matched 
markets above. These results give further evidence in support of the learning 
story. 
V CONCLUSION 
Although the evidence provided in this paper is of only two firms in one 
national market, the flavor is clear: BK consistently locates closer to the first 
McD outlet than we would expect if pre-emption, product differentiation, or 
pure chance (such as local planning) were driving the location decisions. We 
also find that the distance between the first McD outlet and the BK outlet is 
negatively affected by the time the first McD outlet has been in the market, 
conditional on the rank of the McD outlet. All this suggests that in making its 
location decisions, BK learns from (the first) McD, and that this effect 
overwhelms other effects on location.  
 The implication from an industrial organization point of view is that 
notwithstanding the importance of (strategic) competition in oligopolistic 
markets, inter-firm (knowledge) spillovers may be of overriding importance 
even for firms that have invested a great deal into solving the problems 
relating to optimal product positioning in the markets they serve.  We know 
they are important in R&D intensive industries, but to find they are important 
in fast food retailing is rather more novel. 
                                                 
17 When using the natural logarithm of the distance between the first McD and BK as the dependent 
variable (columns (7) and (8)), results were not robust to the choice of the rank variable. When using 
the actual rank, the signal coefficients were insignificant. 
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The implication from a public policy point of view is a negative one.  
The UK is subject to significant planning laws constraining the opening of 
certain types of retail outlet.  In the case of fast food, an existing site must by 
“A3” classified in order to be suitable.  In the case of a new site, in order to 
get a designation, the retail chain will need to assure the local planning 
authority, acting for residents, that a significant nuisance such as smell or 
traffic congestion will not ensue.  It has been argued in other retail contexts, 
in particular supermarkets (Competition Commission, 2000) that planning law 
constrains the growth of competition, so enhancing the existing market power 
of incumbents (see also McKinsey, 1988).  However in the present context, 
we found no evidence for the pre-emption view.  Thus there is no evidence, 
in the context of small fast food outlets, that the growth of competition is 
being constrained. 
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Table 1: 
Key dates in the UK history of burger retailing 
Date Event 
1960s Wimpy brand established as offshoot of J Lyons 
1970s Wimpy established limited counter service concept 
1974 McDonalds opens first store 
1977 Wimpy chain bought by United Biscuits 
1983 McDonalds exceeds 100 outlets 
1986 McDonalds exceeds 200 outlets  
McDonalds starts to franchise outlets 
1988/89 
1989 
Burger King brand (at this time small) bought by Grand Met 
Grand Met buys Wimpy from United Biscuits 
1990 Burger King has 60 outlets 
Grand Mets burger operations separated into table and counter service 
Counter Service operations mostly re-badged as Burger King 
Wimpy International (with 220 table-service outlets) formed by 
management buy-out from Grand Met 
Grand Met insists on 3 year agreement preventing Wimpy opening 
counter service or drive in outlets 
1993 June: Grand Met/ Wimpy agreement expires 
McDonalds has around 500 outlets 
1994 Wimpy has 240 outlets, all eat-in 
end 1995 Burger King has approx. 300 outlets McDonalds has over 600 outlets 
May 1996 Wimpy has 272 outlets 
McDonalds and Burger King each opening around 70 restaurants per 
year 
2001 Wimpy still has less than 300 outlets, McDonalds over 1000 outlets. 
 
 23
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of local authority districts 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Area (thousand 
square km) 
0.493 0.717 0.015 6.497 
Population 
(thousands) 
124.0 94.956 11 1017 
Youth (%) 14.0 1.127 7.0 17.0 
Pensioners (%) 19.0 3.452 12.0 35.0 
Council Tax (£) 419.761 163.724 0 963 
Wage (£000) 13.985 1.801 1.085 17.208 
Unemployment 
(%) 
6.0 2.386 1.0 26.0 
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Table 3 
 Sample characteristics 
District  
Market 
area Entry order
1st/2nd same 
chain 
First mb 
pair 
ref # sq. km.   dist. metres dist. metres 
4 204 mmb 2445 2690 
26 112 mmb 475 87 
50 367 mmmb 8934 971 
53 410 mmb 11165 11177 
59 78 mmmmmb 2571 122 
89 637 mmb 14358 20889 
94 75 mmmb 1544 125 
100 333 mmb 1917 147 
117 43 mmb 1252 1114 
180 315 mmb 3597 11536 
181 32 mmb 1609 5468 
231 80 bbm 422 185 
275 290 mmb 3617 180 
283 93 mmb 1325 612 
291 97 mmmb 5471 680 
292 98 mmmmb 3877 3877 
296 69 mmb 1453 45 
309 160 mmb 5790 5886 
314 199 mmmb 9541 260 
315 137 mmb 2300 2307 
316 35 mmmb 1876 299 
323 142 mmb 2655 4893 
331 153 mmmmmb 21717 21716 
333 159 mmmb 3477 3548 
370 246 mmb 5304 160 
422 235 mmb 3293 3374 
437 81 mmmb 3852 6468 
438 48 mmmb 4614 5419 
444 110 mmmmb 6326 4482 
448 38 mmmb 3603 3317 
451 38 mmmb 3021 302 
453 56 mmmb 656 420 
455 29 mmmmb 2931 3187 
456 43 mmb 294 473 
 
 25
 
 
Table 3 continued 
 Sample characteristics 
District Market area Entry order 1st/2nd same chain First mb pair
ref # sq. km.   dist. metres dist. metres 
12 197 mbm 2556 152 
46 29 mbb 218 141 
55 333 mbm 1592 436 
65 130 mbm 1108 1975 
96 41 bmb 780 410 
107 39 mbm 1776 148 
111 39 mbm 1506 178 
116 477 mbm 1388 311 
128 309 mbm 4778 113 
148 42 mmb/mbm 331 63 
166 212 mbm 3662 440 
168 98 bmm 8593 242 
178 309 mbm 9236 253 
219 375 mbm 2014 112 
248 41 mmb/mbm 3422 1086 
297 448 mbm 1689 138 
306 99 mmb/mbm 5009 241 
310 97 mbb 1021 790 
365 120 mbm 3161 275 
385 184 mbb 640 324 
410 285 bmb 2748 1772 
419 307 bmm 3092 3232 
435 87 mmb/mbm 381 81 
Mean 167  3649 2444 
Median 116    2702 438 
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Table 4 
Distances across the first three outlets where the 
second has a different identity from the first 
District   m1b1 
dist. 
m2b/mb
2 dist. 
 “same
” dist. 
 
Mean 
  561.45 2476.88  2639.22 
s.d.  774.50 2450.80  2393.17 
median  252.74 1774.08  1776.09 
t test 
1 
Is prob of 
20/23 
chance? 
(1/3-
20/3)/((20/23*3/23)/23)0.5= 
-7.64 
No 
t test 
2 
Diff 
between 
means 
(561.45-2476.88)/535.9=  
 -3.57 
Yes 
 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics on distances, 1994 
Metres minMP MinMB  minBP  minMK minMB min KB  minMW minBW min MB 
# of districts 36 36  36 18 18 18 20 20 20
median 181.69 218.71  299.00 198.28 525.88 405.29 234.19 305.90 181.55
mean 824.95 1174.10  2744.72 1432.84 1703.73 2467.08 705.80 2900.58 1511.12
sd 1849.15 3505.38  5307.21 2209.97 2852.08 3555.44 1392.98 5539.15 3032.42
             
Proportion minMW minBW  minMB  minMP minMK minBP  min KB min MM  
# of districts 20 20  57 36 18 36 18 51  
median 0.017 0.021  0.022 0.014 0.018 0.024 0.034 0.197 
mean 0.074 0.242  0.091 0.075 0.148 0.195 0.183 0.225 
sd 0.160 0.413  0.176 0.164 0.248 0.337 0.242 0.158 
Note: M = McD , P = Pizza Hut, B =  BK, K = KFC, W = Wimpy. 
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Table 6 
Comparisons across successive outlet differences 
       
 Outlets 1 and 2 2 and 3 1 and 3  
Differences 
between means 
       
mmm mean 5250.69 4576.91 5284.55 All insignificant 
 sd 5021.30 2893.19 4127.67  
mbm mean 375.187 2666.46 2725.63 t=-4.08 
 sd 492.34 2190.24 2225.34 at least 
Note: 16 observations in each case, drawn from Table 3   
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Table 7 
Regression results 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Time -
9587.19*** 
(3522.57) 
-
15068.36**   
(6314.07) 
-9095.01**   
(4228.23) 
-9200.87*  
(5150.26) 
1232.704   
(3281.13
) 
-
15810.41**   
(7567.77) 
-3.34**   
(1.40) 
-2.56   
(2.94) 
Time sq. - 2552.73**   
(1126.08) 
- 3336.68***   
(1240.88) 
- 4820.30***  
(1754.50) 
- -0.28   
(0.58) 
Rank -
3007.99***   
(1085.62) 
-1723.98   
(1323.72) 
-52.25*   
(27.69) 
21.32   
(38.11) 
10.104   
(15.53) 
23.87**   
(11.17) 
-0.95**   
(0.47) 
-0.67    
(0.79) 
Market 
controls 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Distance 
between 
McD 
outlets 
Yes 
(+, sign.) 
Yes 
(+, sign.) 
Yes 
(+, sign.) 
Yes 
(+, sign.) 
Yes 
(+, sign.) 
Yes 
(+, sign.) 
Yes 
(+, sign.) 
Yes 
(+, sign.) 
# of McD 
outlets 
Yes 
(insign.) 
Yes 
(insign.) 
Yes 
(insign.) 
Yes 
(insign.) 
Yes 
(insign.) 
Yes 
(insign.) 
Yes 
(insign.) 
Yes 
(insign.) 
Nobs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-sq. 0.71 0.84 0.67 0.83 0.63 0.82 0.40 0.61 
F-test p-
value 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes:  
Dependent variable is distance between first McD outlet and the BK outlet (in meters) in Columns (1)-(6), and its 
natural logarithm in (7)-(8).  
Reported numbers are coefficient and (standard error). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity of 
unknown form.  
***, **, and  *, and denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels.   
The measure of signal (Time) is the natural log of time of the first McD outlet in the market prior to 1990 in 
Columns (1) and (2) and (7) and (8), and the same in linear form in Columns (3) and (4). In Columns (5) and (6) 
the measure is the natural logarithm between the time of entry of the first McD and BK outlets. 
In Columns (1)-(2) and (7)-(8) the measure of the rank of the first McD is a categorical variable increasing in value 
by 1 after each additional 50 outlets.  In Columns (3)-(6) the measure of rank is the actual rank of the first McD 
outlet.   
Market controls include the population and the geographic area of the market, the proportion of under-16 and over 
65-year olds, an indicator for markets in London, and the number of McD (BK) outlets in neighboring districts as of 
beginning of the year of BK entry. Of these, youth and pension coefficients were usually significant and positive, 
population’s negative and significant. Others’ coefficients were never significant. 
F-test p-value is the probability value of the F-test on the joint significance of all explanatory variables. 
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